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There is an increasing recognition that investment in human 
development at an earlier age can have a significant impact 
on the lifetime earnings capacity of an individual. This 
notion is the basis for the popularity of conditional cash 
transfer programs to help boost child health and educa-
tion outcomes. The evidence on the impact of conditional 
cash transfers on health and education outcomes, however, 
is mixed. This paper uses panel data from a pilot project 
and evaluates the impact of conditional cash transfers on 
consumption, education, and nutrition outcomes among 
poor rural families in Bangladesh. Given implementation 
challenges the intervention was not able to improve school 
attendance. However the analysis shows that the pilot had 
a significant impact on the incidence of wasting among 
children who were 10–22 months old when the program 
started, reducing the share of children with weight-for-
height below two standard deviations from the World 
Health Organization benchmark by 40 percent. The pilot 
was also able to improve nutrition knowledge: there was a 
significant increase in the proportion of beneficiary mothers 
who knew about the importance of exclusively breastfeed-
ing infants until the age of six months.  The results also 
suggest a significant positive impact on food consumption, 
especially consumption of food with high protein content. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large body of literature that suggests that, if implemented well, conditional 
cash transfers (CCTs) are appropriate demand side interventions that can have a significant 
positive impact on both poverty and human development outcomes (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). 
Popularly known as CCTs, these programs offer a way to arrest the intergenerational transmission 
of poverty by increasing current household investment in human capital formation. They do so by 
providing regular cash payments to families on the condition that they fulfill certain basic 
obligations, which are typically related to the usage of health or education services. Thus, the 
nature of the intervention increases consumption or has an “income effect.” It also increases the 
relative benefit of the service or the intervention that the cash transfer is being conditioned on, 
thereby generating a further “price effect” on the household decision to invest in schooling or 
other services that formulate the conditions for receiving the cash transfer. These effects are 
reflected in evaluations of CCTs which generally find that these programs boost household 
consumption, as well as have a positive effect on increasing use of health and education services. 
Well-known examples of CCTs that have been widely evaluated and shown to have had 
impressive positive results on poverty and the use of health and education services include 
Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in Brazil. The evidence on health and education 
outcomes, however, is mixed. Although CCTs increase the likelihood that households will take 
their children for preventative health check-ups, only in some cases has this been shown to 
improve child nutritional status among beneficiary households. There are papers that argue that 
there may be limited impact of conditioning cash transfers, and that given the costs involved in 
setting up compliance monitoring mechanisms in CCTs, there may be a case for keeping cash 
transfers “unconditional” (Baird et al, 2011). This debate on whether to introduce conditional as 
opposed to unconditional cash transfers is all the more relevant in low income country contexts 
such as Bangladesh where there are limitations of both public resources as well as of capacity to 
implement programs. A subtle but important argument presented in Baird et al (2011) is that 
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country context matters whereby the impact of the conditionality is greater if it attempts to 
change household behavior as opposed to merely addressing a financial constraint. Akresh et al 
(2013) add another element to this debate by arguing that conditionality can be important if one is 
trying to influence household investment decisions on “marginal” children, i.e. those who are 
initially not enrolled in school or less likely to go to school such as girls, younger children or 
lower ability children.  
The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) was among the first to pioneer conditional cash 
transfers in the early 1990s in the form of the Female School Stipend Program (FSSP). Studies 
have found some contribution of this program to the fourfold increase in female secondary school 
enrollment thereby reversing gender gaps in secondary level education outcomes.1 Since then, 
several CCT programs were implemented mainly to improve primary education outcomes. These 
include the Primary Education Stipend Program in 2002 and the Reaching Out-of-School 
Children in 2004. Experimentation with conditional cash transfers to improve the utilization of 
health services or outcomes is far more limited. While there are a couple of small programs that 
have tried to use conditional cash transfers to improve maternal and infant health (e.g. the 
Maternity Voucher Scheme and the Lactating Mothers Scheme), robust evaluations of these 
programs do not exist. More recently, the GoB piloted a CCT delivered through local 
governments, known as the Shombhob project which focused on improving both education and 
nutrition outcomes of young children. The Shombhob project (“Shombhob” means “possible” in 
Bangla) delivered bi-monthly cash transfers to very poor households with children aged 0 to 36 
months or children attending primary school provided that they fulfill a range of nutrition and 
education-related obligations. This paper assesses the impact of this intervention on household 
1 Khandker et al (2003) and Fuwa (2001) find that 8 percent of the increase in school enrollment can be 
attributed to FSSP. Shamsuddin (2013) finds that the program increased education level completed by at 
least half a class, and the likelihood of women working in the formal sector. Other factors for the increase 
in female secondary enrollment may have also played a role. Heath and Mobarak (2012) examine the 
impact of job availability on parents’ decision to invest in their children’s education, and suggest that it was 
the growth in the garment industry that led to an increase in female school enrollment rather than the 
government FSSP program. 
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welfare, as well as on school attendance and a set of nutrition-related outcomes. Using a panel 
data set, the paper uses the design features of the project to identify the impact of the intervention. 
Specifically, the paper estimates the effects of the Shombhob pilot on the following outcomes: (i) 
household food consumption; (ii) school attendance for primary-school-aged (6-15 years old) 
beneficiary children;2 (iii) incidence of underweight, wasting and stunting among beneficiary 
children aged below 3 years old; and (iv) nutrition-related knowledge and practices in beneficiary 
households with at least one child aged 0 to 36 months. Findings from the paper are able to 
contribute to the vast literature on the impact of CCTs, particularly on the much less studied 
impact on nutrition-related outcomes. The paper also assesses the effectiveness of the program 
processes and thus offers lessons on the design and implementation should the GoB were to scale 
up the intervention.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Bangladesh context and the 
design of the project. Section 3 describes the study design and the empirical methodology. The 
main findings of the evaluation are presented in Section 4. Finally, based on the findings of this 
paper, section 5 provides recommendations on the options for an expansion of the project.  
2. The Bangladesh Context and Design of the Shombhob Pilot Project 
2.1 Background 
Despite remarkable progress in poverty reduction, extreme poverty and vulnerability in 
Bangladesh remain stubborn problems, which in turn can negatively affect child nutrition and 
educational outcomes. National level poverty lines suggest that poverty fell from 48.9 percent in 
2000 to 40 percent in 2005 to 31.5 percent in 2010. Coupled with this progress was a consistent 
advancement in well-being and increased caloric intake and educational attainments across all 
income groups. Nevertheless an estimated 26 million people still remain in extreme poverty, and 
2 The Government of Bangladesh considers children aged 6 to 15 the target group of primary education and 
displays education on this age group for primary school enrollment and attendance. In order to allow for 
comparison with official statistics, the same age group was used in this paper. 
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improving the human development outcomes for poor children remain a formidable challenge for 
Bangladesh. While there has been significant progress in reducing the incidence of underweight 
children below 5 years (from 60 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 2011), progress in reducing 
wasting and stunting3 has been less encouraging. The rate of reduction in stunting from 2004 to 
2011 was only 1.3 percentage points per year while the prevalence of wasting remained virtually 
the same. The incidence of low birth weight among newborn babies in Bangladesh is among the 
highest in the world, ranging between 20 to 22 percent, and maternal under nutrition is at about 
24 percent (NIPORT, 2013). Poor dietary diversity and insufficient minerals in the average diet 
cause major diseases. Although the problem of under nutrition affects the whole population, the 
poor primarily bear its burden: improvements in childhood underweight and wasting outcomes 
show a strong negative wealth gradient (World Bank, 2013a). 
While Bangladesh has been able to make much better progress in improving outcomes in 
primary education, some gaps between the poor and non-poor still remain. Inequity in primary 
enrollment because of household poverty has been reduced by half between 2000 and 2010. 
However, while more children of primary school age were attending primary school in 2010 
compared to 2000, repetition and dropout rates still remain high. About 5 million children are still 
out of the school system and most of them are from poor households (World Bank, 2013b). The 
poorest children (coming from the poorest 20 percent of families) are 12 percent more likely to be 
out of school, and this difference is mostly due to them having a lower chance of ever enrolling in 
or completing grade one, compared to the richest 20 percent. For poor children in Bangladesh, the 
opportunity cost of attending school can be high4. Further increases in completion rates will thus 
need to be supported by interventions that help to increase both student enrollment and retention 
among poor children.  Moreover, children living in slums are particularly vulnerable for 
3 Underweight children are too thin for their age, wasted children are too thin for their high, and stunted children are 
too short for their age. See detailed discussion on underweight, stunting and wasting on page 27. 
4 In fact recent analysis (Ito and Shonchoy, 2014) finds statistically significant impacts of seasonal labor 
demand on the school dropout rate in Bangladesh among children from agricultural households. 
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remaining out of the school system, and thus require additional focus.  
Given this potential scope for demand side interventions to improve both nutrition and 
education outcomes among the poorest in Bangladesh, the GoB introduced the Shombhob pilot 
intervention in January 2012. Implemented by the Ministry of Local Government, the Shombhob 
project was designed to set up a conditional cash transfer mechanism that would work with poor 
mothers and their children to improve school attendance and nutrition behavior and outcomes.  
2.2 Project design 
The objective of the Shombhob project was threefold: (i) test the delivery of conditional 
cash transfers to the poorest households through local governments to reduce their household 
poverty levels, (ii) increase school attendance of beneficiary children going to primary school, 
and (iii) improve the nutritional status of beneficiary children aged 0 to 36 months old. 
Specifically, the pilot project was expected to result in the following human development 
outcomes: 
(i)  Improvements in attendance rates among beneficiary children attending primary school; 
(ii)  Increased attainment of “age specific goal weight” (e.g. incidence of underweight, 
wasting and stunting) among 0 to 36 months; 
(iii)  Increased nutrition-related knowledge and practice among mothers with children aged 0 
to 36 months; 
 (iv)  Increased rate of exclusive breastfeeding of children aged 0 to 6 months; 
(v)  Increased dietary diversity and appropriate frequency of feeding among children aged 7 
to 24 months. 
The choice of the above indicators was based on the notion that the intervention will be 
carried out for at least 24 months covering two academic years from December 2011 to  
December 2013. However due to start up delays, implementation only began in February 2012, 
allowing transfers to be provided for 21 months (from April 2012 to December 2013).  In 
addition, the project faced additional implementation challenges due to the annual floods that hit 
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the project locations during the months of August and September. School closures due to these 
floods constituted the most serious implementation challenge given focus of the transfers on 
regular school attendance. These implementation challenges coupled with the fact that the impact 
evaluation only covers 13 months of cash transfers are likely to affect the impact of the 
intervention on some of the above indicators.  
Ten Unions5 from two rural Upazilas6 (Jaldhaka and Hatibandha) located in the Rangpur 
Division, which is the poorest in Bangladesh, were chosen as the pilot locations. To test the pilot 
in an urban setting, the project was also located in the slums of Narayanganj City Corporation. 
The choice of Narayanganj was mainly driven by the practical consideration that the city offers 
large numbers of semi-public slums where the chances of “slum eviction” is likely to be minimal. 
A detailed list of the rural and urban locations is provided in Tables A1 and A2 in Annex I. 
Following a Public Information Campaign on the project objectives and duration, the targeting 
and enrollment processes were carried out. The Project used Proxy Means Test (PMT) scores to 
determine household eligibility.7 To create the initial beneficiary roster, Shombhob set up an open 
registration process where interested households with at least one child age 0-36 months8 and/or 
at least one primary-school-aged child were invited to come and apply to be selected by the 
project. During registration, each household had to fill in a questionnaire which gathered all the 
information and variables needed to construct a PMT score based on the formula and weights 
developed for Bangladesh in Sharif (2009) (see Table B1 in Annex II for the list of variables 
included in the PMT formula).  
5 Unions are the lowest administrative unit in the Upazila. There are generally about 10 Unions per Upazila. 
6 Upazilas are the lowest administrative unit in the Districts. Districts are the composed of Divisions. There 
are 64 Districts and 7 Divisions in Bangladesh. 
7 The PMT based methodology predicts household wealth using a set of observable and verifiable variables 
that are highly correlated with household consumption.  
8 Even though initially the project design included children below the age of 24 months, during 
implementation the age limit was increased to 36 months. The delay in implementation by six months since 
the implementation of the baseline survey led to this change. 
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Out of the 37,801 families who applied for the program, the poorest 15,952 families were 
selected based on their PMT scores. This meant that the cut off lines or the eligibility thresholds 
for selection was a PMT score of 660 for the two rural Upazilas and 690 for the Narayanganj City 
Corporation (NCC).9 The list of eligible beneficiaries was then validated by community leaders, 
and verified by UP chairmen, and the Mayor’s office in the case of NCC. UP Chairmen, 
members, leaders of communities also played a role in explaining the project objectives to the 
targeted families. The eligible families were requested to enroll into the project, and this 
enrollment process was completed in April 2012. The final number of enrolled households was 
14,125. Among this roster of eligible households, there were 7,004 children who were eligible to 
receive the nutrition benefit and 15,774 children who were eligible to receive the education 
benefit. The breakdown of the beneficiary families in terms of their location and the type of 
benefit is provided in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Distribution of Beneficiaries 
Total beneficiaries 14,125 families 
Jaldhaka  7,735 families 
Hatibandha  4,238 families 
Narayanganj  2,154 families 
Nutrition-related benefits  7,004 children 
Education-related benefits 15,774 children 
 
Once enrollment was completed the project delivered cash payments every two months to 
the enrolled households from April 2012 to December 2013. Three types of transfers were set up 
depending on the household demographic composition. Beneficiary households received: (i) a 
transfer of BDT 400 (approximately USD 5) per household if the household members included 
9 The two cutoff points, 660 and 690, are given without any unit, as they are a score. These cut-offs 
represent respectively the 19 and 47 percentiles of the national income distribution (data from HIES 2005). 
These cut offs were determined based on both the resource envelop and the capacity of the implementing 
agency to monitor the project. A higher cut off was used for Narayanganj as it is relatively wealthier than 
rural areas in Rangpur and to minimize undercoverage rates. Using a higher cut off line for urban areas 
relative to rural areas is also consistent with the recommendations in Sharif (2009). 
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one or more children aged 0 to 36 months;10 (ii) BDT 400 per household if eligible families had 
one or more children going to primary school; and (iii) BDT 800 for those households with 
children below 36 months of age as well as children going to primary school. These transfers 
were a flat amount and did not vary with the number of children in either category.11 Thus the 
maximum benefit amount a household could receive was BDT800 per month. An innovative 
electronic payments system was developed with the Bangladesh Post Office (BPO), which 
provided cash cards to beneficiary mothers to make transfers electronically to their accounts with 
the Post Office. Payments were made using Point-of-Sales (POS) machines with the option of 
accessing the cash either at the village level with the help of a “mobile payments team” or at the 
Upazila level BPO branch office.  The BPO arranged for a mobile team to travel with POS 
machines and cash to the village centers on a designated day during each payment cycle. 
Alternatively the beneficiary had the option to withdraw cash at any point in time from the 
Upazila BPO branch office. BPO received a small commission for this service – 1 percent of the 
transferred amount or BDT 10, whichever is higher. Payment verification as a result was made 
possible in real time and provided to the project management.  
The average transfers under this pilot are relatively higher than other existing social 
safety net programs, but nevertheless low enough to not lower incentives to work. The maximum 
monthly amount was BDT 800, which is about 14 percent of the lower poverty line and 18 
percent of the 2010 food poverty line (World Bank, 2013a). Evidence from CCT programs in 
other developing countries suggest limited labor disincentive impacts especially when the level of 
benefit is within 20 percent of beneficiary households’ income (Grosh et al, 2008). These 
transfers were linked to specific conditions on the part of beneficiary households. To ensure that 
households knew these conditions, each household received a booklet, which detailed the purpose 
10 While the original target group was children below the age of 24 months, due to the delay between 
collecting the baseline data and the start of the project, program design was changed to increase the age 
limit of children to be eligible for the nutrition allowance. 
11 This was a conscious decision so as to not provide incentives to increase the size of households, and 
counter the family planning policies of the Government.  
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of the pilot project and its timeline, the eligibility criteria, beneficiary conditions, and the 
payments and grievance redress mechanisms. Table 2 presents the benefit schedule and the 
conditions that determined the size of monthly transfers. 
Table 2: Benefit Amounts 
   
Target group Type of benefit Condition 
Households with children aged 
0-36 months 
Nutrition allowance of 
BDT 400 per month 
Monthly attendance at growth 
monitoring of children aged 0 – 36 
months, and nutrition session for 
mother/caregiver 
Households with children going 
to primary school (6-15 years) 
Education allowance 
of BDT 400 per month 
Regular school attendance (at least 
80 percent every month) for 
enrolled children in primary school 
 
The education and nutrition transfers were conditioned on (i) attendance at regular local 
government or non-government primary schools (at least 80 percent of classes) by primary school 
going children;12 and (ii) regular growth monitoring of beneficiary children aged 0-36 months. 
Participation in monthly nutrition-related education sessions by mothers of children aged 0 to 36 
months or caregivers and other decision-makers (e.g. mothers in law, fathers) were encouraged 
but was not mandatory. School attendance was monitored at the school level by Shombhob 
officers using the attendance sheets supplied by the schools.  
 
3. Impact evaluation design 
3.1 Panel Data and Sampling Framework 
Even though the project was implemented in three locations, due to time and resource 
constraints, the localities chosen for the impact evaluation of the project were Jaldhaka Upazila 
12 Local government officers were responsible for visiting the schools every 45 days to take records of the 
children’s attendance.  In practice, this was a challenging task – too few officers were tasked with visiting a 
large number of schools and beneficiary children’s enrollment information had to be verified every cycle 
due to poor record-keeping and information flow. 
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and Narayanganj City Corporation only. A baseline survey was fielded prior to the initiation of 
the project in May/June 2011 based on a two-stage process. The first stage included a complete 
census of all households in the five project unions of Jaldhaka Upazila (Kaimari, Saulmari, 
Khutamara, Kathali, and Mirganj Unions) and in the 36 government-recognized slums of 
Narayanganj. The census questionnaire collected information on all the variables needed to 
compute household level PMT scores. The census survey provided information on 36,610 
households in the Jaldhaka unions, and 7,980 households in the slums of Narayanganj. 
Information on household demographics, household head characteristics, household assets, type 
of housing, access to facilities and overseas remittances allowed the construction of a PMT score 
for each household (see Table B2 in Annex II for a complete list of variables collected and 
weights associated). The universe of households to draw from was further restricted using 
households’ likelihood of being a Shombhob beneficiary: households with PMT scores above the 
50th percentile were discarded and the rest was divided between households with PMT scores 
below the 25th percentile (potential beneficiaries) and households with PMT scores between 25th 
and 50th percentile (potential controls).13 In the second stage, a random sample of 3,000 
households was drawn from the census list and interviewed. This stratified sample resulted in 
having 2,400 households from rural Jaldhaka Upazila, and 600 households from the slums of 
Narayanganj. Data was stratified in each location to ensure representativeness of the four 
different types of families (no qualifying children, households with young children (0-36 months 
old) only, households with children going to primary school (6-15 years old) only, and 
households with both). Households were randomly selected within each of the four demographic 
groups and within each of the two PMT score groups (below the 25th percentile and between the 
25th and 50th percentiles).  
13 The choice of the eligibility threshold was 25th percentile since the incidence of extreme poverty at the 
time of the project design was 25 percent. However, during implementation the cut off line was lowered 
due to changes in the poverty rates as well as to limit the number of beneficiaries to a manageable size. 
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Table 3: Number of Households in the Shombhob panel sample 
 Jaldhaka (rural) Narayanganj (urban) 
 Treatment (T) Control (C) Treatment (T) Control (C) 
Nutrition only 224 440 41 101 
Education only 195 501 15 123 
Nutrition + Education 281 302 34 107 
None - 344 - 10 
Total hhs 700 1,587 90 341 
Attrition 114 173 
 
These same households participated in a follow-up end line survey fielded in May/June 
2013, 13 months after receipt of the first Shombhob payment. The follow-up survey used the 
original baseline questionnaire and respondent lists. To ensure there were enough households in 
each component of the treatment and control groups, a sample of 3,005 households was 
interviewed. Based on these three sets of data (from the census, baseline and endline surveys), a 
panel of 2,718 households remained to conduct our analysis.14 Table 3 presents the different 
samples in the data set. In Jaldhaka, 700 households received at least one Shombhob transfer, 
1,587 did not receive any, and 114 households interviewed during the baseline were not found 
when the enumerators came back for the endline survey. In Narayanganj, 90 households received 
at least one Shombhob transfer, 341 did not receive any, and 173 households could not be located 
at the time of the endline survey. The high attrition rate in Narayanganj while not unusual given 
the high frequency of in and out migration among the residents of urban slums, is clearly a 
challenge for any social program targeted towards the urban slum population. Due to this high 
attrition rate in Narayanganj, the impact evaluation was restricted to the Jaldhaka sample. 
3.2 Methodology 
To determine the impact of Shombhob we use the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) or 
double difference methodology which compares the outcomes of beneficiary households and their 
14 2,718 corressponds to 3,005 panel households minus 287 households that moved out of the pilot location. 
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children before and after the implementation of Shombhob to derive impact estimates. Ideally the 
net impact of the pilot would be measured by comparing the change in the presence of the 
intervention and in the absence of the intervention. However since it is not possible to observe the 
same households and children in both of these states, the DiD estimator assumes that the average 
change in the comparison group represents the counterfactual change in the treatment group if 
there were no treatment. This allows a reliable inference of program impact by comparing the 
pre- to post-intervention change in the outcome of interest for the treated group relative to a 
comparison group. The net impact of Shombhob is defined, as shown in equation 1 below, as the 
change in the outcome of interest of beneficiary households and their children (treatment) minus 
that of non-Shombhob households and their children (control), before and after the project 
implementation: 
Impacty = (yshom, after – yshom, before) – (ynon-shom, after – ynon-shom, before)    (1) 
where (yhh status, time) indicate the enrollment status of a given household before and after project 
implementation. The change in the outcome of Shombhob households is given as (yshom, after – 
yshom, before). Similarly, the change in the outcome of non-Shombhob households over the same 
period is given as (ynon-shom, after – ynon-shom, before). Therefore, the net project impact on the change in 
the outcome is calculated by equation 1, which yields the difference of growth in the outcome for 
the Shombhob households (treatment) and the non-Shombhob households (control) before and 
after the project implementation. The estimated impact is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Difference-in-differences Methodology 
 
 
Instead of computing this double difference in means, we run a set of DiD regressions, allowing 
controlling for differences in observable characteristics: 
Yit = α + β Ti + γ t + δ Ti t + φ Xi + εit   (2) 
where t stands for the period (t = 0 for the baseline, and 1 for the endline). Yit is the outcome of 
household i in period t. Ti represent the treatment status of the household: it takes the value 0 if in 
the control group (non-Shombhob) and 1 if in the treatment group (enrolled in Shombhob). Xi is a 
set of additional observable characteristics,15 and εit is an error term. β measures the difference 
between treatment and control at baseline, γ shows the difference in outcomes between baseline 
and endline in the absence of the program, and δ is our coefficient of interest and the estimated 
impact of the program on Y (see Figure 1).School Enrollment: Impact he Conditional Cash  
One key assumption of the estimation strategy described above is that unobservable 
factors (“heterogeneity”) that shape actual program participation of the household is additively 
linear in nature and “differenced away” by the DiD estimation. This is equivalent to the 
15 Two sets of additional characteristics are used. First, we use the PMT score as a composite indicator of 
household characteristics. Second, we use a set of household characteristics: household head gender, age 
and education, presence of agricultural laborer, housing characteristics (roof, walls, latrines, tube well, 
electricity), asset ownership (housed, cattle, land, fan, television, bicycle), and remittances. 
Outcome (y) 
Baseline (t=0) Endline (t=1) Time (t) 
Shombhob 
(treatment) 
Non-Shombhob 
(control) 
δ = impact 
γ 
β 
15 
 
                                                 
assumption that in the absence of the intervention, the difference in the outcomes between 
treatment and control groups would move in tandem, decreasing or increasing at the same pace. 
The error term, however, could still be contaminated with factors that shape both program 
participation and outcomes which could lead to a violation of the above identifying assumption of 
equal trends in the absence of the intervention. One way to deal with possible selection bias is to 
use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) technique that exploits the targeting design itself. 
RDD is a quasi-experimental design and makes use of discontinuities generated by program 
eligibility criteria such that program assignment is based on a cut-off point of some assignment 
variable. Households are assigned to the treatment group by a non-random assignment rule based 
on the assignment variable. The eligibility for becoming beneficiaries of a program is solely 
determined by whether they are below or above the unique value of a cut-off point. This is a case 
of “sharp RD design” (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1997). In other words, the 
probability of being exposed to treatment changes from 0 to 1 discontinuously as one crosses the 
cut-off. RDD identifies and estimates the program impact in the neighborhood of the cut-off point 
for selection into the program. Within a small interval of the cut-off, households on either side of 
the cut-off have similar income levels and can be thought to have similar growth in the outcomes 
in the absence of cash transfers or in the presence of cash transfers, and therefore form very good 
comparison groups. To elaborate further, suppose that the pre- treatment relationship between the 
assignment score (S) and the outcome variable (Y) is given by the following straight line linear 
regression: 
Y= α + βS + є   (3) 
Where α and β are the regression coefficients and є is the error term. After the treatment, if the 
treated subjects are affected by a constant treatment effect (β0) on the outcome variable, the 
regression equation can be revised as follows: 
Yi= α + βoTi + βi Si + єi              (4) 
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Ti = 1 if subject i is assigned to the treatment, 0 otherwise. Because of the constant effect 
assumption, the slope of the regression line does not change but the intercept changes to α + βo 
for the treatment group. We interpret the constant effect βo as the program effect.  
The eligibility requirement to participate in Shombhob or the assignment score S in 
equation 4 is to have a PMT score that is lower than 660 in Jaldhaka, and thus we are able to 
fulfill the sharp discontinuity assumption. Figure 2 below shows that this eligibility threshold 
falls between the means of both the consumption distribution of participants (solid line), and that 
of rejected applicants (dotted line), and thus implies that there is a considerable number of 
households just to the right of the threshold that have a PMT score very close to that of eligible 
households.  
Figure 2: Eligibility threshold to determine treatment and control groups 
 
Thus these households constitute a reasonable control group since comparing a sample of 
households within a very small range around the eligibility score is analogous to conducting a 
randomized control trial. Households with a score just to the left and just to the right of the 
threshold score may be considered as identical in the sense that in the absence of Shombhob, the 
unconditional mean values of the outcomes Yit are the same. Therefore, it would be reasonable to 
evaluate the program by comparing outcomes of eligible families with Shombhob scores just 
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below the cutoff (treatment) with those of ineligible families with Shombhob scores just above 
the cutoff (control).  
However the program implementation allowed us to construct several control groups to 
estimate the impact of the project. First, to derive the main results of the analysis we use the full 
sample of beneficiaries (i.e. the treatment group or T) and those who applied yet did not receive 
the program (i.e. the first set of control group, C1). T and C1 are expected to have similar scores 
and motivation: households in both groups belong to the bottom 50 percent of the income 
distribution and applied to the program. Second, we compare T with the group of households in 
the panel who did not receive any transfers under the Shombhob. This second control group, 
C1+C2, includes C1 and the group of households who did not apply and thus did not get any 
Shombhob transfer. This robustness check, while a “fuzzy RD design,” increases the statistical 
power of the estimates and gives insight on the impact of Shombhob on a larger set of households. 
Third, we restrict the treatment and control groups to the households whose PMT is below 660: 
due to measurement error during the registration process, some rejected households actually 
record PMT scores below 660.16 Lastly, we use the full sample (T versus C1+C2) with new 
weights inversely proportional to the distance between household PMT and the eligibility 
threshold |PMTi-660|. This fourth robustness check increases the power of the estimates – just 
like the second robustness check using the larger C1+C2 control group. It also allows us to give 
more weight to the observations closer to one another – i.e. those immediately above and below 
the PMT threshold, and less weight to those further away from the threshold – i.e. less 
comparable households. 
16 We know what the “true” PMT score is from the preliminary census that was conducted prior to the 
implementation of Shombhob. We believe that the baseline census records household level “true” 
information as trained enumerators were able to verify the information given to them by the households. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table B2 in Annex II provides descriptive statistics of the households followed by the 
panel. In the case of Jaldhaka, the average household size is the same as the national average of 
4.5 but the total monthly household consumption is BDT 6,066 which is significantly lower than 
the national average as found in the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2010. 
Half of the total household expenditure is spent on food. A majority of household heads does not 
have an education and very few households own durable assets. Asset ownership and housing 
characteristics are poor, and worse than an average household in Bangladesh. Over 40 percent of 
household heads are casual agricultural laborer. The average size of land owned is about 1.8 
acres. Both these characteristics are highly correlated with extreme poverty in Bangladesh. In the 
case of Narayanganj, households are larger in size compared to the rural panel but per capita 
consumption is higher than the rural sample. Interestingly the majority of urban households had 
access to electricity unlike the households in the rural sample. However, a much smaller 
proportion had access to latrines compared to rural households. A similar pattern is observed with 
access to safe water: a much larger proportion of rural households had access to safe water 
compared to urban households. The situation is the reverse when it comes to asset ownership: 
more urban households owned television and fans, which is consistent with the fact that these 
households had more access to electricity than households in rural Jaldhaka.  
Table B2 also provides a comparison between the households in the panel, and those who 
were not located at the time of the endline survey. We find that in the case of Jaldhaka, on 
average, families who disappeared between the two rounds were more vulnerable: they were 
poorer, with fewer assets, and more likely to rely on remittances compared to those who stayed 
behind. Only 5 percent of the 2401 households surveyed at baseline in rural Jaldhaka were not 
found at the time of the endline survey. In the case of Narayanganj, we find a similar pattern in 
that those households who left the project area were relatively poorer with worse access to 
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facilities compared to those who remained. The out migration in Narayanganj however was 
relatively high - almost 30 percent of the households surveyed in the first wave were not found at 
the time of the endline survey. As mentioned earlier, due to this high attrition rate in the urban 
sample, the impact evaluation exercise is restricted to the rural sample in Jaldhaka only.  
Table 4 presents a comparison of the outcome variables between the treatment and 
control households before the implementation of the Shombhob pilot. Most of the differences 
between the treatment and control households are in nutrition outcomes – the treatment 
households appear to be worse off compared to the control households in the case of incidence of 
stunting, wasting, underweight, knowledge of breastfeeding, and dietary diversity. The same is 
true in terms of household consumption. School attendance (defined as the number of classes 
missed in the last two weeks) and enrollment rates however are almost identical.  
Table 4: Baseline outcome indicators by treatment and control households, Jaldhaka 
Dietary diversityd 12.1 13.7 12.5 24.2 21.8 25.3 13.0 
 
Table B3 in Annex II provides descriptive statistics of other household level 
characteristics of both the treatment and control groups. The data suggest the two groups are quite 
 
Treat-
ment 
Control Bangladesh 
 C1 + C2 C1 All Rural 
Rang-
pura 
Lowest 
wealth 
quintile 
Consumption (BDT per month) 
Per capita consumption 1,117 1,358 1,310 2,565 2,177 1,845 - 
Total household consumption 5,548 5,938 5,780 11,003 9,436 7,703 - 
Food household consumption 3,168 3,193 3,153 6,031 5,543 4,783 - 
Education (children 6-15 years old) 
School enrollment 88.7 88.2 87.3 84 83.4 84.7  
School attendance 5.4 5.3 5.8 - - - - 
Nutrition (0-3 years old when enrolled)                      (0-59 monthsb) 
Stunting 47.2 44.4 43.3 41.3 42.7 42.9 53.7 
Underweight 47.1 44.3 42.9 36.4 38.7 34.5 50.3 
Wasting 27.8 23.9 22.9 15.6 16.0 13.2 17.5 
Breastfeeding knowledge c 83.1 86.3 88.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
a: For consumption data, rural Rangpur only is displayed. For all other statistics, aggregated data for 
Rangpur (rural + urban) is shown. b: nutrition data is taken from the Bangladesh Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS) 2011. c: Knowledge about breastfeeding is asked to any mother who had a child with the past 
36 months. d: Dietary diversity is measured on 6-60 month-old babies as the proportion of children having 
at least one of the 4+ food groups.  
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similar in terms of their observable characteristics, but treatment households are slightly bigger 
despite having the same number of young children (0-3 years of age). In both groups, household 
heads are on average 37 years of age, and over 90 percent of them are men. About half of the 
household heads are engaged in agricultural labor, and fewer than 10 percent hold non-
agricultural jobs. Asset ownership is similar across the two groups (land, cattle, tube well, fan, 
television, bicycle, number of rooms) except for house ownership (slightly higher for the control 
group), and one in 7 households (treatment and control) receive remittances. Treatment and 
control houses have the same probability of having young infants, but control houses have less 
children on average (0.74 as compared to 1.27 for treatment families), leading to slightly smaller 
households (4.5 members on average as compared to 5 for treatment families).  
Since much of the impact of any project depends on how well the project is implemented, 
it is important to also assess these processes if possible. Since the Shombhob project had a dual 
objective of setting up a local level cash transfer modality and improving poor children’s 
nutrition and education outcomes, the survey instruments included many questions related to 
these project processes. Therefore before assessing the impact of the project on the above 
outcomes variables, we first look at whether the processes such as registration and payments were 
implemented properly. Following which we assess the impact on: (ii) household consumption 
variables; (ii) school attendance of primary-school-aged children; and (iii) nutrition outcomes for 
children aged 0 to 36 months. However we limit the analysis to the Jaldhaka sample only, and use 
the first control group, C1 (i.e. those applied but were not selected).  
4.2 Process Assessment 
Results from the panel of Shombhob participants suggest that the project was 
implemented reasonably well. To select beneficiary households from Jaldhaka, the PMT 
eligibility threshold used for the rural areas was 660. This represented a cut-off at the 19th 
percentile on the actual expenditure distribution. An application booth was set up in each union 
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after a brief public information campaign. Field level staff hired under the project was responsible 
for collecting the information from interested applicants. The data was then entered into an 
automated Management Information System (MIS), the respective weights were applied to the 
different variables collected to construct each household level PMT score, following which 
eligibility was determined based on the eligibility cut-off score of 660.  
The panel data allows us to assess how well this mechanism performed in terms of 
identifying poorer sections of the society. The left panel in Figure 3 shows that the self-reported 
data generated relatively reasonable PMT scores: a majority of Shombhob beneficiaries had PMT 
scores below the 660 threshold, while a majority of non-beneficiary households had PMT scores 
above 660. Moreover, when we divide the control group between those who applied and were 
rejected from the program on the basis of their PMT score, and those who did not apply at all, we 
find that the latter group had a flatter distribution with more individuals in the upper part of the 
distribution. The data seems to suggest that the public information campaign and the PMT based 
targeting system worked well: the project was able to reasonably identify the most vulnerable. 
That households who did not apply belonged to richer sections of the society and rightfully self-
selected themselves out of applying is confirmed by the right panel in Figure 3. Beneficiary 
households have lower per capita consumption levels than those who applied and were rejected. 
This latter group has slightly lower per capita consumption levels than those who did not apply. 
Thus it appears as though Shombhob beneficiary identification mechanism - comprised of a 
public information system and PMT based application system - was relatively successful in being 
able to target the right beneficiaries for the pilot.  
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Figure 3: PMT and per capita consumption - Treatment and Control – Baseline – Jaldhaka 
 
 
The endline survey data suggests that a majority of non-recipients in the panel appeared 
to be quite satisfied with the application and selection process, with less than 20 percent who 
responded that the process to unfair. According to Table 5, the information campaign reached 
about 90 percent of the population in the five selected unions of Jaldhaka: half of the households 
heard about the program from a Shombhob officer, and the other half through their family 
members. Households had a general sense of the eligibility criteria. However, only 80 percent of 
the selected households came to the registration sessions with all the needed documents. This 
meant that families had to return with additional proofs or photocopies, and on average, it took 
about 8 days to complete the application process. There were some hidden costs to the 
application, mainly those who received the educational allowance: a third of the households had 
to pay for school certificates to complete the application. This was confirmed also during the 
implementation phase of Shombhob, as the majority of households with children attending 
primary school said they had difficulty getting an attendance certificate from the school, or that 
they had to pay a small fee for it. Some other costs that were incurred included taking pictures 
and getting other documents such as birth registration cards or child immunization cards (which 
was used in lieu of birth registration cards). 
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The payments mechanism also functioned well in Jaldhaka: 95 percent of the households 
received the payment transfer through the BPO mobile POS machines without any hassle. The 
processing time for the cash payments was affected by the large numbers of payments having to 
be made in one go – on average recipients had to wait 2.5 hours in queue. Even though 
households had the option of withdrawing their transfer amount at any time from the Upazila Post 
Office, to improve access by mostly poor mothers with limited access to public transport, the 
mobile withdrawal system was implemented. This significantly reduced the travel time to access 
the transfers: beneficiaries had to travel an average of 47 minutes to the BPO mobile set up 
whereas only about half of the households had access to the Post Office. Beneficiaries incurred a 
cost of about BDT 12 to receive their transfer. 
Table 5: Shombhob Processes 
 Narayanganj Jaldhaka 
Households who knew about Shombhob (%) 90.2 88.8 
Households knowledge of following eligibility criteria (%):   
 - need to be poor  57.3 47.7 
 - need child aged 0-36 months 52.6 59.1 
 - need child going to primary school 42.7 51.4 
Paid for picture (%) 46 61.4 
Paid for school certificate (%) 12.6 29.4 
Paid for birth certificate (%) 34.3 48.3 
Paid for other documents (%) 3.6 6.5 
No. of days needed to complete application 10 8.0 
Amount paid for additional school certificate (BDT ) 23.3 14.2 
Travel time to collect the Shombhob cash transfer (minutes) 34.8 47.2 
Waiting time to collect the Shombhob cash transfer (minutes) 131.9 154.4 
Cost of collecting the Shombhob cash transfer (BDT ) 38.2 12.3 
Needed a new PIN over the last 12 months (%) 1.7 6.8 
Knowledge of payment day (%) 95 90.9 
 
The data from Narayanganj show more or less similar performance in terms of these 
processes. While the time to collect the transfer was less, the costs associated with withdrawal 
were thrice the amount compared to beneficiaries in Jaldhaka. The costs of paying for school 
certificates were also higher in Narayanganj but less people had to pay for this service. It appears 
that mothers in Narayanganj were better able to manage the electronic payment process – four 
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times more mothers in Jaldhaka may have lost their PIN and had to seek another one. All mothers 
were aware of the paydays, suggesting that in general the payment mechanism even though new 
to them, worked well. 
 4.3 Impact on school attendance 
The education transfer made under Shombhob was essentially aimed at improving school 
attendance. Transfers of BDT 400 were made to mothers of primary-school-aged children who 
were already enrolled. This design was motivated by the fact that the project implementation 
began in the middle of the school year, and thus it would have not been able to affect school 
enrollment. As expected we find no significant impact of Shombhob on school enrollment in 
Jaldhaka (See column one in Table 6). However, the impact of Shombhob on school attendance 
was also not significant (column two in Table 6). These results while are inconsistent with other 
evaluations that show significant positive impacts on school attendance resulting from both 
unconditional and conditional cash transfers (Saavedra and Garcia, 2012; Akresh et al, 2013), 
they are consistent with the implementation bottlenecks faced by the project discussed earlier.  
The process evaluation report of Shombhob (World Bank, 2013c) elaborates on a number 
of challenges  faced by the education component during implementation. Due to limited ability of 
the project personnel to supervise the large number of schools and monitor school attendance, the 
compliance monitoring of the education transfer was loose. To receive their transfers, primary-
school-aged children were supposed to attend school at least 80 percent of the time, but in reality 
it was very challenging for program administrators to collect that information for the large 
numbers of schools where the beneficiary children attended. In addition, due to flooding during 
the months of September/October of 2012, the transfers were made regardless of the attendance 
rate. The lack of consistency in the implementation of the education transfer could have clouded 
the understanding of the beneficiary households on their co-responsibilities.  
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Table 6: Impact of Shombhob on education – Children aged 6-15 years old 
  School enrollment Number of days in school over past 2 weeks 
Impact of Shombhob (δ) 0.036 0.511  
(0.03) (0.39) 
(T-C) at baseline (β) 0.032 -0.501* (0.02) (0.28) 
Trend for non-recipients (γ) 0.002 -1.427*** (0.02) (0.34) 
Constant 1.034*** 8.859*** 
 (0.14) (2.78) 
Controls Yes Yes 
R2 0.041 0.056  
Df 2,760 2,304 
Number Obs. 2,804 2,348 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Controls include: household head gender, age, 
education, household size, housing characteristics, asset ownership, remittances. Note: the difference in the 
number of observations is due to missing data. 
 
 
It is also possible that these results are picking up the initial lag that has been found in 
other CCTs linked to enrollment. Akresh et al (2013) find that a CCT in Burkina Faso did not 
have a significant impact on enrollment in the first year (possibly due to similar delays in 
implementation as in the case of Shombhob) but that it had a positive impact in the second year. 
Another possibility is that given other existing education CCT programs that operate nationwide, 
e.g. the Primary Stipend Program and the Reaching Out of School Children Program, the 
additional incentive provided by the Shombhob pilot was not sufficient to have an impact on 
school attendance.  
4.4 Nutrition knowledge and outcomes 
The Shombhob pilot was designed to have an impact on children’s nutrition through two 
channels. First, beneficiary mothers were required to attend monthly growth monitoring sessions, 
during which their children below the age of three were weighed and measured. Mothers also 
received a monthly nutrition counseling session on how best to care and feed their children so that 
they are better able to link nutrition with child growth. Second, mothers received a cash transfer 
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of BDT 400 per child per month to allow them to improve the feeding practices of their children 
based on the knowledge they gained through these sessions.  
Three standard indices of physical growth used to describe the nutritional status of 
children17 include (i) height-for-age or stunting; (ii) weight-for-height or wasting; and (iii) 
weight-for-age or underweight. Each of these indices provides different information about the 
growth and body composition that reflects a child’s nutritional status. For instance, 
• Stunting - or height-for-age - measures linear growth. A child who is more than two 
standard deviations below the median (-2 SD) of the WHO reference population in terms of 
height-for-age is considered short for his or her age, or stunted. This condition reflects the 
cumulative effect of chronic malnutrition. Stunting reflects a failure to receive adequate nutrition 
over a long period of time and is worsened by recurrent and chronic illness. Height-for-age, 
therefore, reflects the long-term effects of malnutrition in a population and does not vary 
appreciably according to recent dietary intake. 
• Wasting - weight-for-height - describes current nutritional status. A child who is more 
than two standard deviations below (-2 SD) the reference median for weight-for-height is 
considered to be too thin for his or her height, or wasted. This condition reflects acute or recent 
nutritional deficit. 
• Underweight - or weight-for-age - is a composite index of weight-for-height and height-
for-age. Thus, it does not distinguish between acute malnutrition (wasting) and chronic 
malnutrition (stunting). A child can be underweight for his age because he or she is stunted, 
because he or she is wasted, or both. Children whose weight-for-age is below two standard 
17 For the purposes of this evaluation, the nutritional status of children in the survey population is compared with the 
World Health Organization (WHO) Child Growth Standards, which are based on an international sample of ethnically, 
culturally, and genetically diverse healthy children living under optimum conditions that are conducive to achieving a 
child’s full genetic growth potential. The WHO Child Growth Standards identify breastfed children as the normative 
model for growth and development and document how children should grow under optimum conditions and with 
optimum infant feeding and child health practices. These standards can be used therefore to assess the nutritional status 
of the beneficiary children in our sample. 
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deviations (-2 SD) from the median of the reference population are classified as underweight. 
Weight-for-age is an overall indicator of a population’s nutritional health. 
Generally compared to wasting, stunting and underweight outcomes are more difficult to 
affect in the short-term. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the length of the impact evaluation 
period is only 13 months, we assess the impact of the intervention on all three indicators. In 
addition to the above indicators, a few indicators related to nutrition knowledge and practices 
were collected, including dietary diversity for children aged 6 months and above, and 
introduction of solid foods for children aged 6-9 months. The following outcome indicators were 
thus constructed and assessed: 
• Semi-solid food intake is the proportion of children 6 to 9 months who had semi-solid 
foods over the past 24 hours. 
• Knowledge on infant feeding practices is the proportion of mothers who know that they 
should exclusively breastfeed their infants until the age of 6 months.18 
• Minimum dietary diversity is the proportion of children 6 months and above fed from at 
least four food groups. Consumption of food from at least four food groups means that the child 
has a high likelihood of consuming at least one animal source of food and at least one fruit or 
vegetable in addition to a staple food (grains, roots, or tubers) (WHO, 2008). The four food 
groups should come from a list of seven food groups: (i) grains, roots, and tubers; (ii) legumes 
and nuts; (iii) dairy products (milk yogurt, cheese); (iv) flesh foods (meat, fish, poultry, and 
liver/organ meat); (v) eggs; (vi) vitamin A-rich fruits and vegetables; and (vii) other fruits and 
vegetables. 
Table 7 presents the results on the above-mentioned nutrition outcomes. Mothers’ 
knowledge about best breastfeeding practices improved significantly more in Shombhob 
households: 6.3 percentage points more mothers know that they should breastfeed their children 
18 Additional indicators were initially tested as well but did not yield any results: proportion of mother who 
immediately breastfeed their newborn, frequency of feeding for children aged 9-12 months. 
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exclusively until they reach the age of 6 months (see Column 1). Given that initially 83.1 percent 
of the mothers knew about breastfeeding practices, this represents an increase of 8 percent. 
Dietary diversity or consumption of more than four out of the seven food groups19 among 
children older than 6 months also improved but not significantly. We find a significant 
improvement in the incidence of wasting – or weight-for-height – among the cohort of children 
aged 10 to 22 months at the time of enrollment:20 wasting was reduced by 12.5 percentage points, 
which is a reduction of about 40 percent of wasted children in this age group. On the other hand 
for children aged between 22 to 46 months years of age at the time of enrollment,21 the impact 
was not significant. We do not find any significant impact on the incidence of stunting and 
underweight, neither at the aggregate level, nor by age group. These results are consistent with 
studies that suggest that even if wasting outcomes are affected in the short-term, the incidence of 
stunting and underweight need a longer-term intervention (UNICEF, 2013).  
Table 7: Impact of Shombhob on nutrition outcomes 
  
Mother's 
knowledge 
about 
infant 
feeding 
Dietary 
diversity 
(6+ 
months) 
Stunting Under weight 
Wasting 
22-46 months  
when 
enrolled 
10-22 months 
 when 
enrolled 
Impact of Shombhob (δ) 
0.063* 0.031 0.034 0.046 -0.036 -0.125* 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)  
(T-C) at baseline (β) 
  -0.015 -0.023 0.059** 0.103**  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)  
Trend for non-recipients 
(γ) 
  0.060 -0.083** -0.086*** -0.079  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)  
Constant   -0.222 -0.001 0.256 0.120  
   (0.43) (0.42) (0.35) (0.37)  
Controls     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.117 0.052 0.036 0.049 0.093  
Df   1,536 1,594 1,552 606 
Number Obs. 1,538 1,318 1,580 1,638 1,596 648 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Controls include: household head gender, age, education, 
household size, housing characteristics, asset ownership, remittances.  
 
These results also lend some support to the widely held view that nutrition interventions 
19 A standard practice recommended by Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices (IYFP). 
20 Due to delays in program implementation, children aged 0-12 months at the time of the baseline survey 
were 10-22 months when the pilot implementation actually started. 
21 Similarly, these children were 12-36 months old at the time of the baseline survey.  
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are perhaps most effective when given to children in the first 1,000 days of their lives  covering 
pregnancy and the child’s first two years. 
4.5 Impact on household welfare 
We also estimate the impact of the project on household welfare. Out of the total sample, 
65 percent received a single benefit of BDT 400 per month while the remaining households 
received two benefits amounting to BDT 800. On average, beneficiaries received a transfer of 
BDT 542 per month. In Table 8 we analyze the impact of cash transfers on per capita 
consumption, total household consumption, food consumption, as well as the consumption of the 
food with high protein content. The results are presented in Table 8.  First, we find that there is a 
significant increase in the household consumption of beneficiaries of about BDT 379, or about 95 
percent of the benefit size of BDT 400 or 70 percent of the average size of transfers received by 
the sample.  
Table 8: Impact of Shombhob on consumption  
  Total consumption 
Food 
consumption 
Protein consumption 
HH receiving nutrition 
transfers 
HH receiving  
education 
transfer 
Impact of Shombhob (δ) 
378.8* 337.0*** 174.2*** 118.0**  
(215.8) (107.3) (46.4) (54.5) 
(T-C) at baseline (β) 
-477.0*** -205.7*** -65.0* -83.1**  
(156.5) (77.8) (33.5) (39.7) 
Trend for non- recipients 
(γ) 
52.6 96.1 150.4*** 163.7*** 
(166.5) (82.8) (35.6) (45.1) 
Constant 715.6 1970.6* 764.2* 527.3* 
 (2168.9) (1078.6) (400.2) (294.4) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2  
Df 2,330 2,330 1,636 1,458 
Number Obs. 2,376 2,376 1,680 1,502 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Controls include: household head gender, age, education, 
household size, housing characteristics, asset ownership, remittances.  
 
This increase in consumption is mostly passed onto food expenses: 89 percent of the 
increase in consumption constitutes food consumption. Shombhob recipients spend about BDT 
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340 per month more on food than the control group a year after Shombhob started (see column 2 
in Table 8). This significant increase occurred despite controlling for the fact that food expenses 
went up by BDT 250 for both the treatment and control group between the baseline and the 
endline surveys. Given that the total food consumption prior to the program was on average of 
BDT 3,168 for families who were about to become beneficiaries, BDT 340 represents an increase 
of 11 percent.  
Possibly a more significant result from a nutrition point of view that we find is the impact 
of the intervention on the food consumption pattern of beneficiary households compared to their 
control group. Upon disaggregation of the expenditure date by item, we find that food expenses 
on proteins – meat, eggs, dairy, fish and pulses – increased significantly for Shombhob recipients. 
This impact was larger for beneficiary households receiving the nutrition package compared to 
those who received only the education benefit. On average, a Shombhob recipient who received 
the nutrition benefit spent BDT 174 more on protein consumption relative to a non-recipient. 
While recipients of the education benefit also had a significantly greater expense on protein 
consumption than non-recipient households, it was less than the additional expense made by 
beneficiary households who received the nutrition benefit. This result is consistent with the fact 
that 70.5 percent of the sample in Jaldhaka, irrespective of the type of transfer they received, said 
that the money they received under the project was used for purchasing food for their children.  
The above results are consistent with distributions illustrated in Figure 4. When we plot 
per capita consumption for each of the three groups at endline - (i) Shombhob beneficiaries; (ii) 
those who applied and were rejected; and (iii) those who did not apply, we see a shift in the 
consumption distribution of Shombhob beneficiaries to the right, indicating that the gap between 
the two distributions found at baseline has diminished over the period of the panel survey.  
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Figure 4: Per Capita Consumption Distributions at Baseline and Endline - Jaldhaka 
 
One possible caveat to the above analysis is the potential bias that could possibly be 
introduced by the nature of the control groups since we compare households from the bottom 25th 
percentiles (treatment group, T) to households from the 25th to 50th percentiles (control group, C), 
who are slightly better off (See Table B3 in Annex II). However, the implementation design 
allowed us to create different control groups as explained earlier. These additional impact 
estimates (presented in Tables B4-B22 in Annex II) using the different control groups suggest 
similar impact of the project on these outcomes related to education and nutrition, and on total 
household consumption, food consumption, and the consumption of protein. Similarly, we 
conduct robustness checks to rule out bias due to inclusion and exclusion errors at the enrollment 
stage, and the Shombhob results remain unchanged. 
 Another possible caveat results from the fact that that the above results do not address 
possible spillover effects. It is possible that mothers who were not enrolled in the program (and 
are in the control group) came on their own to the nutrition sessions, or heard about the 
importance of growth monitoring of young children, and in fact did go and receive this service 
elsewhere. However this would suggest that the magnitude of Shombhob impact is biased 
downwards, but the validity of the results is not compromised. 
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5. Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper suggest that the Shombhob Pilot Project despite some 
implementation challenges was able to have a positive impact in improving the welfare of 
extremely poor households as well as household consumption patterns towards more proteins in 
the short term. In a country where rice is the main source of energy for poor households, and 
where large gaps in the consumption of proteins such as milk, eggs and meat often distinguishes a 
poor from a non-poor household (World Bank, 2013a), the impact on consumption patterns is a 
significant finding, particularly from a nutrition point of view. The significant reduction in the 
incidence of wasting among young children in Shombhob beneficiary households further suggests 
the potential for conditional cash transfers to contribute to better nutrition outcomes. The results 
however do not find a significant impact on the incidence of stunting and underweight which is 
not surprising since these outcomes are generally more stubborn to affect and require a longer 
term intervention. We find some improvement in mother’s knowledge about the need for 
exclusive breastfeeding infant until the age of six months. The results on knowledge however are 
not able to take into account potential “spillover effects” since nutrition sessions were delivered 
via classes held out in the open. In some villages, the growth monitoring was also conducted in 
courtyards. This modality of conducting the nutrition and growth monitoring sessions allowed 
non-beneficiary mothers to have access nutrition-related knowledge that this analysis is not able 
to capture. The results are consistent with the expected impacts associated with a short 
implementation period of the pilot project, and are by no means conclusive when it comes to its 
impact on education outcomes.    
In terms of the cost-benefit analysis, over the course of the 20 months of implementation, 
Shombhob was able to deliver USD 1.78 million in cash transfers to 14, 125 families and 
monitoring growth and school attendance of a total of 22,778 children. The administrative cost 
associated with the delivery of the services under the pilot intervention, including the 
development of an automated MIS was about USD 641,000. This meant that the cost to deliver 
33 
 
the transfer was USD 1.4 per child per month, or about 28 percent of the monthly transfer amount 
of USD 5. It is common for the cost-to-transfer ratios (CTRs) of pilot interventions to be 
relatively large as there are no economies of scale. However when compared to other similar 
interventions, Shombhob appears reasonably cost-effective.22    
 The process assessment and the results from the impact evaluation of the Shombhob pilot 
project suggest that given appropriate tailoring of an intervention and its proper implementation, 
there is potential to bring about certain changes in household behavior that can help in improving 
child nutrition outcomes when cash transfers are conditioned on child growth monitoring. The 
practical challenges of using conditional cash transfers to improve school attendance were also 
highlighted by the results. While changes in some behavior and long-term outcomes are not likely 
to be captured in a 13-month time frame, we find that the combination of nutrition information, 
growth monitoring and cash are able to motivate mothers towards nutrition-enhancing feeding 
practices. Most importantly the results suggest CCTs are able to affect household poverty as well 
as a set of important human development outcomes in the short term, thereby making them 
valuable instruments in the fight against poverty in the Bangladesh context.    
  
22 Caldes et al (2006) finds CTRs for three similar programs to be 10.6 percent in Mexico, 49.9 percent in 
Hondura and 62.9 percent in Nicaragua over the length of these programs. For the first year of these 
programs, the CTRs were 134.2, 114.5 and 254.3 respectively. 
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Annex I: Shombhob locations 
Shombhob covered five UPs in Hatibandha and five UPs in Jaldhaka and some selected slums 
under Narayanganj City Corporation. The pilot was implemented in both urban and rural areas. 
The locations as shown in Table 1 included 5 selected unions in Jaldhaka Upazila - Kaimari, 
Saulmari, Khutamara, Kathali and Mirganj unions; and 5 unions in Hatibandha Upazila - 
Patikapara, Nowdabash, Daoabari, Shingimari and Sindurna unions. The third area for this pilot 
included 35 selected slums in Narayanganj City Corporation (see Table 2). 
The areas were selected based on where there is a household database based on poverty indicators 
(i.e.  Proxy-Means test) being implemented by LGED; where there is a relatively high poverty 
rate; and, areas easily accessible for intense monitoring.  
Table A1: Selected Rural Areas 
Upazila Union Parishad 
Hatibandha 
Patikapara 
Nowdabash 
Daoabari 
Shingimari 
Shinduma 
Jaldhaka 
Kaimari 
Saulmari 
Khutamara 
Kathali 
Mirganj 
 
Table A2: Selected Urban Areas 
Selected Slums in Nayaranganj City Corporation 
1 Bag Para (Poor Community) 13 Rishi Para 25 Rupaer Bari 
2 Ibrahim Textile Mill 14 Kumudini Garden Three 26 Kumudini Bagan 
3 B J M C Department (PC) 15 Old Zimkhana Slum 27 Muchi Bari (Pc) 
4 Jele Para 16 Shahid Nagar 28 Sweeper Colony 
5 Bhuiyan Para 17 Muslim Nagar 29 Rally Bagan (South) 
6 Talla Baro Mosque 18 Al Amin Nagar 30 Rally Bagan(North) 
7 Haziganj Railway Slum 19 Deara 31 No 1 Railgate Slum 
8 Bou Bazar Railway Slum 20 Nulua Para 32 New Zimkhana Slum 
9 Johan & Brothers  21 Khalil Mia's Home (Pc 33 Baburail Rishi Para 
10 Kumudini Bagan (N) 22 Slums Near Isadair Ra 34 Tati Para 
11 D N Road Slum 23 Isdair Sweeper Colony 35 Bepari Para Sonkahol 
12 Notun Lama Para  36 Isdair Railway Slum   
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Annex II 
Table B1: Proxy-Means Test weights 
Variables Weights Variables Weights 
Location Household assets 
  Sylhet 0   Own tube well 8 
  Dhaka -10   Own house 4 
  Barisal -31   Own fan 7 
  Chittagong -12   Own TV 12 
  Khulna -26   Own cattle 3 
  Rajshahi -26   Own bicycle 3 
Household characteristics   Own land = none 0 
  Size = 2 0   Own land = 0-1.5 acres 5 
  Size = 3 -13   Own land = over 1.5 acres 23 
  Size = 4 -20 Housing 
  Size = 5 -26   No. members per room -4 
  Size = 6 -29   Roof = cement 0 
  Size = 7 -32   Roof = wood -36 
  Size ≥ 8 -36   Rood = tin -28 
  No. of children (0-15y.o.) = 0 0   Roof = straw/bamboo/other -31 
  No. of children (0-15y.o.) = 1 -7   Wall = brick 0 
  No. of children (0-15y.o.) = 2 -10   Wall = mud -13 
  No. of children (0-15y.o.) = 3 -11   Wall = tin -10 
  No. of children (0-15y.o.) ≥ 4 -16   Wall = straw/bamboo/other -16 
  Spouse education = none 0 Access to facilities/remittances 
  Spouse education = under 5 yrs 0   No electricity -2 
  Spouse education = 5-9 yrs 3   No latrine 0 
  Spouse education = over 10 yrs 15   Kacha permanent latrine 6 
  HH member work as ag. laborer -9   Kacha temporary latrine 6 
  HH member non ag. laborer -5   Sanitary latrine 11 
  No spouse/separated/widowed -18   Foreign remittances 13 
Household head characteristics   
  30-50 years old 5   
  Less than 30, more than 50 y.o. 0   
  Education = none 0 Constant 757 
  Education = under 5 yrs 7   
  Education = 5-9 yrs 12   
  Education = over 10 yrs 19   
Note: the choice of variables to include in the Proxy-Means Test exercise and the weights associated with 
the variables is derived entirely from Sharif, I.2009. “Building a Targeting System in Bangladesh based on 
Proxy-Means Testing,” World Bank Social Protection Discussion Series No. 0914. 
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Table B2: Descriptive statistics of survey households 
  Jaldhaka (rural) Narayanganj (urban) National 
  Attrition Panel T-test  Attrition Panel T-test  HIES 2010 
Number observations 114 2,287  173 431  12240 
Proportion (%) 4.7  -    28.6  -      
Household size 3.6 4.5 *** 4.8 5.6 *** 4.5 
No of children 0-3yrs 0.6 0.6  0.7 0.8  0.4 
No of children 6-12yrs 0.6 1 *** 1 1.1  0.8 
Total monthly 
consumption 4,648 6,066 *** 8,822 11,015 *** 11002.5 
Month food 
consumption 2,572 3,290 *** 5,064 5,942 *** 6030.8 
Proportion of hhs with 
male head  81.7 90 *** 0.9 0.9  86.1 
Age of hh head  35.9 40.5 *** 38.1 41 *** 45.7 
Agri. Laborer 50 44.5  0 0  17.6 
Non-agri. Laborer 8.8 11.5  2.9 3  19.4 
Proportion of hh head 
with no education 69.3 74.6  59.5 59.4  52.6 
Proportion of hh with 
bamboo wall 49.1 48.8  9.2 4.4 ** 19.2 
Proportion of hh with 
tin roof 95.6 97.7  98.8 96.8  81.5 
Proportion of hh with 
pit latrines  48.2 44  4 10 ** 15.5 
Proportion of hh with 
access to electricity 7.9 8.4  87.9 97 *** 55.2 
Proportion of hh who 
own house 75.4 80.5  8.7 21.8 *** 82.0 
Proportion of hh who 
own cattle 50 74.1 *** 1.7 7.4 *** 36.1 
Amount of land owned 
(acres) 0.4 1.8  0 0  0.7 
Proportion of hh with 
access to a tube well 51.8 70.4 *** 2.3 7 ** 43.6 
Proportion of hh who 
own a fan 2.6 2.2  82.1 93.7 *** 49.0 
Proportion of hh who 
own a television 1.8 2.7  38.7 66.4 *** 35.8 
Proportion of hh who 
own a bike 7.9 20.7 *** 2.9 2.3  23.1 
Proportion of hh who 
receive remittances 
from abroad 
21.9 14.3 ** 7.5 8.8   10.1 
         
Note: *** means that the t-test of difference in means is significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level; and * at the 10 percent level. Thus household size is significantly different between the panel 
and the attrited households, but the number of children under 3 years old is not. 
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Table B3: Descriptive Statistics – Treatment and Control Households at Baseline 
 
T C1+ C2 
C1 
T,  
adjusted 
weights 
C,  
adjusted 
weights 
T, 
PMT≤660 
C1+C2, 
PMT≤660 
Male household head 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 
Household head age 37.1 38.5 37.1 36.4 39.7 38.5 40.1 
Head Agricultural Laborer 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.56 0.61 0.63 
Head Non-agri Laborer 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 
Household size 4.98 4.49 4.41 4.85 4.62 5.44 4.98 
Number of children (0-3) 0.76 0.69 0.78 0.82 0.63 0.74 0.60 
Number of children (6-12) 1.27 0.74 0.65 1.19 0.78 1.62 1.13 
House owner 0.80 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.76 0.79 
Own Cattle 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.70 
Land owned 1.37 1.75 0.25 0.64 0.28 0.00 1.22 
Own Tube well 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.62 
Own Fan 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Own Television 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Own Bicycle 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.17 
Access remittances 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.02 
Number of rooms 1.30 1.43 1.36 1.31 1.41 1.26 1.29 
 
Table B4: Impact of Shombhob on Per Capita Consumption 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
70.3* 101.5** 15.2 63.9* 
(39.2) (42.7) (49.3) (38.4) 
Simple model with PMT 
70.6* 101.4** 33.1 84.8**  
(37.6) (40.9) (47.5) (37.2) 
Model with full set of controls 
48.4 77.1* -18.9 73.1**  
(35.3) (39.4) (45.8) (35.3) 
Number obs. 3,850 2,376 1,632 3,850  
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
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Table B5: Impact of Shombhob on Total Household Consumption 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
429.6 562.0** 182.2 339.0  
(278.8) (282.8) (346.3) (276.6) 
Simple model with 
PMT 
430.2 561.9** 233.6 395.2  
(278.3) (282.6) (344.4) (275.7) 
Model with full set 
of controls 
339.6* 435.9** -17.4 440.7**  
(201.1) (217.1) (273.7) (188.3) 
Number obs. 3,850 2,376 1,632 3,850  
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B6: Impact of Shombhob on Total Food Consumption 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
329.9*** 401.6*** 306.5* 289.1**  
(126.9) (136.7) (174.3) (133.6) 
Simple model with PMT 
329.9*** 401.6*** 321.1* 293.0**  
(126.9) (136.7) (174.1) (133.7) 
Model with full set of controls 
295.7*** 358.5*** 209.2 329.5*** 
(92.8) (107.7) (140.2) (89.2) 
Number obs. 3,850 2,376 1,632 3,850  
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B7: Impact of Shombhob on Total Consumption of Meat, Eggs, Dairy Products, Fish 
and Pulses 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
116.8*** 174.0*** 109.7** 100.7*** 
(38.4) (42.5) (55.0) (37.4) 
Simple model with PMT 
116.9*** 174.0*** 118.5** 106.2*** 
(38.2) (42.3) (54.7) (37.3) 
Model with full set of controls 
107.6*** 160.8*** 87.2* 111.0*** 
(34.2) (39.5) (51.3) (31.6) 
Number obs. 3,850 2,376 1,632 3,850  
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
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Table B8: Impact of Shombhob on Total Consumption of Meat, Eggs and Dairy Products 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
110.4*** 159.6*** 104.1** 104.7*** 
(33.2) (36.7) (47.6) (31.5) 
Simple model with PMT 
110.6*** 159.6*** 111.5** 109.5*** 
(33.0) (36.5) (47.4) (31.5) 
Model with full set of controls 
101.6*** 147.6*** 83.5* 114.6*** 
(29.9) (34.2) (44.5) (27.2) 
Number obs. 3,850 2,376 1,632 3,850  
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B9: Impact of Shombhob on Total Consumption of Fish 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
-6.7 -1.4 -2.5 -19.2**  
(9.6) (11.5) (15.7) (9.7) 
Simple model with PMT 
-6.7 -1.4 -1.8 -19.1* 
(9.6) (11.5) (15.7) (9.7) 
Model with full set of controls 
-6.1 -1.8 -1.6 -20.5**  
(9.5) (11.6) (15.8) (9.5) 
Number obs. 3,850 2,376 1,632 3,850  
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B10: Impact of Shombhob on Total Consumption of Pulses 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
12.1*** 14.9*** 5.2 16.9*** 
(4.6) (5.3) (6.9) (4.4) 
Simple model with PMT 
13.1*** 15.8*** 8.8 15.7*** 
(4.8) (5.4) (7.0) (4.7) 
Model with full set of controls 
12.1*** 14.9*** 5.2 16.9*** 
(4.6) (5.3) (6.9) (4.4) 
Number obs. 3,850 2,376 1,614 3,850  
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
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Table B11: Impact of Shombhob on School Enrollment 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.051** 0.040 0.054* 0.049**  
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Simple model with PMT 
0.052** 0.040 0.056* 0.053**  
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Model with full set of controls 
0.044** 0.036 0.051* 0.051**  
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Number obs. 4,454 2,804 2,404 4,454 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B12: Impact of Shombhob on Number of Days Spent in School (Last 2 Weeks) 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.044** 0.036 0.051* 0.051**  
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Simple model with PMT 
0.432 0.508 0.252 0.359  
(0.29) (0.39) (0.40) (0.29) 
Model with full set of controls 
0.431 0.507 0.253 0.382  
(0.29) (0.39) (0.40) (0.29) 
Number obs. 3.680 2,348 1,938 3,680 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
 
Table B13: Impact of Shombhob on Incidence of Stunting 
 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.029 0.043 0.034 -0.095**  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)  
Simple model with PMT 
0.031 0.046 0.031 -0.095**  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)  
Model with full set of controls 
0.034 0.034 0.030 -0.064  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) 
Number obs. 2,338 1,580 940 2,338 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
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 Table B14: Impact of Shombhob on Incidence of Underweight 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
-0.012 0.041 -0.075 -0.063 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Simple model with PMT 
-0.010 0.044 -0.076 -0.064 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Model with full set of controls 
-0.010 0.046 -0.071 -0.046 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Number obs. 2,442 1,638 986 2,442 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B15: Impact of Shombhob on Incidence of Wasting 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
-0.038 -0.038 -0.080 -0.022 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Simple model with PMT 
-0.039 -0.038 -0.080 -0.022 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Model with full set of controls 
-0.046 -0.036 -0.064 -0.011  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)  
Number obs. 2,374 1,596 952 2,374 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B16: Impact of Shombhob on Incidence of Wasting (12-24 when started the program) 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
-0.142*** -0.109* -0.130 -0.137*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) 
Simple model with PMT 
-0.142*** -0.112* -0.131 -0.136*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) 
Model with full set of controls 
-0.158*** -0.125* -0.120 -0.130**  
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) 
Number obs. 941 648 372 941 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
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Table B17: Impact of Shombhob on Incidence of Wasting (14-36 when started the program) 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.013 -0.046 -0.006 0.064 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) 
Simple model with PMT 
0.008 -0.046 -0.006 0.065 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) 
Model with full set of controls 
0.003 -0.026 0.005 0.055 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) 
Number obs. 880 578 329 880 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B18: Impact of Shombhob on Incidence of Wasting (36-42 when started the program) 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.062 0.118 -0.116 0.022 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
Simple model with PMT 
0.058 0.114 -0.116 0.022 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
Model with full set of controls 
0.062 0.090 -0.010 0.135* 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) 
Number obs. 543 360 245 543 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B19: Impact of Shombhob on Food Diversity (Unbalanced Panel) 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.078** 0.042 0.084 0.101*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Simple model with PMT 
0.070* 0.035 0.086 0.099**  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Model with full set of controls 
0.057 0.022 0.075 0.113*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Number obs. 2,335 1,571 921 2,335 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
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Table B20: Impact of Shombhob on Food Diversity (Balanced Panel) 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.063 0.035 0.043 0.065  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)  
Simple model with PMT 
0.060 0.033 0.043 0.065  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)  
Model with full set of controls 
0.049 0.031 0.037 0.081**  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)  
Number obs. 1,980 1,318 810 1,980 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B21: Impact of Shombhob on Knowledge about Breast Feeding (Unbalanced Panel) 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.076*** 0.092*** 0.155*** 0.076*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  
Simple model with PMT 
0.074** 0.092*** 0.155*** 0.074**  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  
Model with full set of controls 
0.068** 0.071** 0.148*** 0.068**  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  
Number obs. 2,368 1,592 931 2,368 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
 
Table B22: Impact of Shombhob on Knowledge about Breast Feeding (Balanced Panel) 
 C1+C2 C1 PMT≤660 Adjusted Weights 
Simple model 
0.070** 0.088*** 0.156*** 0.070**  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  
Simple model with PMT 
0.068** 0.088*** 0.156*** 0.068**  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  
Model with full set of controls 
0.058** 0.063* 0.147*** 0.058**  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  
Number obs. 2,288 1,538 914 2,288 
C1+C2: group of households who did not receive the program. C1: group of households who applied and 
did not receive the program. PMT<660: treatment and control households with PMT below 660. Adjusted 
weights: all weights are inversely proportional to |PMT-660|. 
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